Department of Computer Science | Institute of Theoretical Computer Science
Game theory provides a good model for the behavior and interactionof the selfish users and programs in large-scale distributed computersystems without central control. The course discusses algorithmicaspects of game theory, such as a general introduction to game theory,auctions, mechanisms, the costs of a central control optimum versusthose of an equilibrium under selfish agents, and algorithms andcomplexity of computing equilibria.
Alternatively, you can also have a look at the course page in the ETH course catalog (VVZ)
weekly on Mondays, 9-12, in CAB
G51, by
weekly on Mondays, 15-17, in CAB G59 and in CHN G42
There are no lecture notes for the course. Taking your own notes is advisable. Some of the material presented in the lecture can be found in the following books:
The LaTeX references are as follows:
There will be weekly exercise assignments. They will appear every Tuesday morning on this web page. You are encouraged to hand in solutions to the problems on Monday during the (following) lecture or at the beginning of the (same day) problem class. The (handed in) solutions will be looked at and returned with comments in the subsequent week. Note, however, that only the specially marked exercises (see below) will count towards your grade. Nevertheless we strongly recommend that you solve all weekly problems and attend the exercise classes.
Your final grade will be calculated as the the weighted average of:
Following the new D-INFK guidelines for doctoral studies, PhD students get credit points according to the same rules that apply for Bachelor or Master students. That is, with a final grade of at least 4 (calculated as explained above) you will receive 7KE, and 0KE otherwise.
Apart from three regular lecture (V) hours and two hour of exercises (U), this course comes with one extra sixth hour of independent work (A); this makes 7 credit points. You will deserve the credits for the A-unit by independent work, i.e. studying and learning material (also prerequisistes) on your own. Details will be announced at the beginning of the course the latest.
Date | Topic | Exercise Sheets | References |
Sep 26 | Introduction; Sharing the Cost of a Multicast Transmission; Auctions; Social Choice | Sheet 1 | partially chapter 14 of AGT; in detail this paper; also, chapter 9.3 of AGT |
Oct 3 | Prisoner's Dilemma, Pollution Game; Strategic Games; Dominance Principle, Nash Equilibrium; Extensive Games, Game Trees, Backward Induction | Sheet 2 | Chapters 1.1 to 1.3.3, 3.7, and 3.8 in AGT |
Oct 10 | Mixed Strategies, Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Best Response Characteristics.Sperner Lemma, Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, Nash Theorem | Graded Sheet 3 | Chapter 3.2 and 3.9 in AGT, Chapters 3 and 7 in GTS; thi is short note |
Oct 17 | Potential Games and Potential Functions, Better Responses.Congestion Games, Rosenthal Theorem, PLS class, and PLS- completeness of Congestion Games | Sheet 4 |
Chapters 19.3, 19.3.2, and 19.3.4 in AGT |
Oct 24 | Inefficency of Equilibria: Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability.Load Balancing Game, Selfish Routing Games, Pigou's Example, Wardrop Theorem | Sheet 5 | Lec cture notes of Chekuri's course; Sections 17.1, 17.2.1, 17.2.2, 17.2.3 and Chapter 18 in AGT |
Oct 31 |
Network Formation Games: Global Connection Game, and Local Connection Game | Graded Sheet 6 | Chapters 19.1, 19.2, and 19.3 in AGT |
Nov 7 | Introduction to Mechanism Design, Voting Methods, Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Theorems | Sheet 7 | Chapters 9.1 and 9.2 in AGT |
Nov 14 | Mechanisms without Money: House Allocations, Stable Matchings | Graded Sheet 8 | Chapters 10.3 and 10.4 in AGT |
Nov 21 | Mechanisms with Money: VCG Mechanisms, Job Scheduling on Related Parallel Machines | Sheet 9 | Chapters 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 and 12.2 in AGT |
Nov 28 | Generalized Auctions: Combinatorial Auctions, com[putational complexity, communication complexity, LOS payments | Graded Sheet 10 | Chapters 11.1 and 11.2 in AGT |
Dec 5 | Best Response Mechanisms, and Applications to BGP Routing(Guest Lecture by Paolo Penna) | Sheet 11 | Lectures Notes by Paolo Penna |
Dec 12 | Matching Markets, Market-Clearing Prices.Sponsored Search, Generalized Second Price Auction | No Exercise Sheet | Chapters 28.1, 28.2, 28.3.1 in AGTLecture notes on m matching markets and sponso ored search by D. Easley and J. Kleinberg |
Dec 19 | Spreading Influence in Social Networks. Cascading Behavior. | No Excercise Sheet | Selected sections of Chapter 24 (24.1, 24.2, 24.4, plus the definitions of 24.3 needed in 24.4) |