Department of Computer Science | Institute of Theoretical Computer Science
Game theory provides a good
model for the behavior and interaction
of the selfish users and
programs in large-scale distributed computer
systems without
central control. The course discusses algorithmic
aspects of game
theory, such as a general introduction to game theory,
auctions,
mechanisms, the costs of a central control optimum versus
those
of an equilibrium under selfish agents, and algorithms
and
complexity of computing
equilibria.
Alternatively, you can also have a look at the course page in the ETH course catalog (VVZ)
weekly on Mondays,
9-12,
in CAB G51
by
weekly on Mondays, 15-17, in CAB G59 and in CAB G56
There are no lecture notes for the course. Taking your own notes is advisable. Some of the material presented in the lecture can be found in the following books:
There will be weekly exercise assignments. They will appear every Tuesday noon on this web page. You are encouraged to hand in solutions to the problems on Monday during the (following) lecture or at the beginning of the (same day) problem class. The (handed in) solutions will be looked at and returned with comments in the subsequent week.
There will be a written exam in the exam session. The exact date will be announced later by the examination office. It will take 3 hours. It will be a closed-book examination.
Following the new
D-INFK guidelines for doctoral studies, PhD students get credit
points according to the same rules that apply for Bachelor or Master
students. That is, with a final grade of at least 4
doctoral
students will receive 7KE, and 0KE otherwise.
Apart from three regular lecture (V) hours and two hour of exercises (U), this course comes with one extra sixth hour of independent work (A); this makes 7 credit points. You will deserve the credits for the A-unit by independent work, i.e. studying and learning material (also prerequisites) on your own. Details will be announced at the beginning of the course the latest.
Date | Topic | Exercise
Sheets | References |
Sep
23 | Introduction; Sharing the Cost of a Multicast Transmission; Auctions; Social Choice | partially chapter 14 of AGT; in detail this paper; also, chapter 9.3 of AGT | |
Sep
30 | Prisoner's Dilemma, Pollution Game; Strategic Games; Dominant-Strategy Equilibrium, Dominance Principle, Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies, Nash Equilibrium; Extensive Games, Game Trees, Backward Induction | Chapters 1.1 to 1.3.3, 3.7, and 3.8 in AGT | |
Oct
07 | Mixed Strategies, Mixed Strategy Nash
Equilibrium, Best Response Characteristics; | Chapter 3.2 and 3.9 in AGT, Chapters 3 and 7 in GTS; this short note | |
Oct
14 | Congestion and Potential Games; Best
and Better Response Dynamics; | Chapters 19.3, 19.3.2, and 19.3.4 in
AGT | |
Oct
21 | Inefficency of Equilibria: Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. Load Balancing Games, Selfish Routing Games, Pigou's Example, Braess paradox, Wardrop Theorem | Lecture
notes of Chekuri's course; Sections 17.1, 17.2.1, 17.2.2, 17.2.3
and Chapter 18 in
AGT | |
Oct
28 | Network Formation Games: Global Connection Games (Network Design Games), and Local Connection Games (Network Creation Games) | Chapters 19.1, 19.2, and 19.3 in AGT | |
Nov
4 | Introduction to Mechanism Design; Voting Methods; Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems | Chapters 9.1 and 9.2 in AGT | |
Nov
11 | Mechanisms without Money: The House Allocation Problem; Stable Matchings | Chapters 10.3 and 10.4 in AGT (Please note that the TTCA algorithm in the book is wrong!) | |
Nov
18 | Mechanisms with Money: VCG Mechanisms, Job Scheduling on Related Parallel Machines | Chapters 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 and 12.2 in
AGT | |
Nov
25 | Generalized Auctions: Combinatorial Auctions; Computational Complexity, Communication Complexity; LOS Mechanism | Chapters 11.1 and 11.2 in AGT | |
Dec
2 | Matching Markets, Market-Clearing Prices; Sponsored Search, Generalized Second Price Auction | Chapters 28.1, 28.2, 28.3.1 in
AGT. Chapters
about matching
markets
and sponsored
search in the book "Networks, Crowds, and Markets: | |
Dec
09 | Spreading Influence/Information in Social Networks. Cascading Behavior | Selected sections of Chapter 24 (24.1, 24.2, 24.4, plus the definitions of 24.3 needed in 24.4) | |
Dec
16 | Myerson's Lemma; Knapsack Auctions | No Sheet | Lecture notes of Lectures 3 and 4 of the AGT course by Tim Roughgarden |